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ABSTRACT 
 
During the past ten years, rural 
Kentucky (and rural pockets 
of nearby states) witnessed the 
emergence of a new 
pharmaceutical drug of abuse.  
The powerful oxycodone, 
OxyContin, first manufactured 
in 1996 and designed for time-
release pain relief, found a 
ready population in rural 
hamlets and mountain 
communities.  Intended for 
patients in pain associated 
with terminal disease, it 
became  a drug of abuse as it 
was over-prescribed and 
trafficked.  This Justice and 
Safety Research Bulletin 
describes the sudden growth in 
the use of this new drug and 
its antecedents.  Describing 
the trends in use and abuse, 
this Bulletin presents evidence 
of an epidemic created in part 
by organizations in both the 
private and public sectors.  It 
describes the marked changes 
in  OxyContin arrests but 
concludes that arrest trends 
likely reveal more about law 
enforcement than drug use.  It 
also describes the much 
publicized  relationship 
between OxyContin use and 
crime in Kentucky, with 
emphasis on the eastern part 
of the state and suggests that 
the much heralded crime 
increases were more rhetorical 
than empirical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OxyContin and Crime in Eastern Kentucky 
 OxyContin (trade name), an oxycodone drug, was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1995 and first marketed in 1996 by Purdue Pharma of Stamford, 
Connecticut.  Among the most powerful analgesics currently manufactured, OxyContin is a 
synthetic opioid.  Opioid drugs (which include opium, heroin, morphine, codeine, 
hydrocodone, and oxycodone) are produced from the opium poppy.  Opiate agonists, such as 
OxyContin, provide pain relief by acting on opioid receptors in the brain, the spinal cord and 
directly on tissue (OxyContin Diversion and Abuse 2002).  OxyContin is a single-entity 
product unlike most oxycodone drugs (e.g., Percodan and Percocet) which typically contain 
aspirin or acetaminophen.  A marked improvement, OxyContin reportedly is 16 times more 
powerful than similar narcotics (Sappenfield 2001).  Designed as an orally administered, time-
release analgesic, OxyContin provides significant and sustained pain relief and, due to its 
addictive propensity, is listed as a Schedule II narcotic (i.e., drugs approved for medical use but 
that have a high potential for abuse) under the Controlled Substances Act.  
OxyContin Abuse 
 OxyContin abuse was first noted in Maryland, the eastern part of rural Maine, eastern 
Ohio, the rust-belt areas of Pennsylvania and the central Appalachian region of West Virginia, 
Virginia and Kentucky.  During the year 2000, the ten states with the highest OxyContin 
prescription rates (per 100,000 population) and those with problems of abuse were, in 
descending order: West Virginia, Alaska, Delaware, New Hampshire, Florida, Kentucky, 
Pennsylvania, Maine, Rhode Island and Connecticut (Hutchinson 2001).  West Virginia, and 
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particularly its southern region, and Southeastern Kentucky have long histories of 
pharmaceutical abuse (DEA briefs and background 2002). 
 OxyContin abuse has been made possible largely by its diversion.  OxyContin is illegally 
acquired with fraudulent prescriptions; through illegal sales; by pharmacy theft and doctor 
shopping; from loosely organized rings of individuals diverting and then selling it; and by way of 
foreign diversion and smuggling into the U.S.  When OxyContin abuse dramatically increased, 
authorities in Pennsylvania, Florida, Ohio, Kentucky and Georgia reported swelling numbers of 
pharmacy robberies, burglaries and theft (OxyContin: Pharmaceutical diversion 2002).  
 Abuse methods vary.  In some cases tablets are crushed and snorted.  In others, the 
powder is diluted and intravenously injected.  A less often used delivery style is to peel off the 
outer coating and chew the tablets (e.g., Sullivan 2001).  These abuse techniques result in the 
sudden absorption of the analgesic rather than as designed -- slowly and continuously over 
several hours.  Not surprisingly, overdoses and deaths have occurred, although despite rhetoric to 
the contrary, the exact number is unknown.  OxyContin-related overdose deaths are difficult to 
disaggregate and the actual number likely will never be known with any degree of certainty.  
This is due in part to poly-drug use, most commonly OxyContin mixed with alcohol and other 
depressants.  Furthermore, data does not distinguish accidental deaths from suicides.  
Nonetheless, all sorts of estimates -- and at times alarming ones -- have been published by the 
media and various office holders. 
 Data, however, indicate consistent increases in the number of new pharmaceutical 
abusers (but not solely oxycodone) and narcotic-related emergency incidents.  During the 1980s, 
fewer than 500,000 people yearly first used prescription drugs for non-medical purposes.  By 
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1998, the number of first-time users was at 1.6 million persons.  Persons reporting at least one 
non-medical use of OxyContin have increased from 221,000 in 1999 to nearly two million 
(National Survey on Drug Use and Health 2003).  Federal data indicate that emergency room 
visits involving oxycodone increased with the introduction of OxyContin.  Between 1990 and 
1996, emergency room treatment of oxycodone remained stable.  After 1996, when OxyContin 
was first manufactured, the number of visits skyrocketed from 100 to nearly 15,000 (Clines and 
Meier 2001).  Nonetheless, emergency rooms  report that oxycodone (there is no separate 
category for OxyContin) is mentioned by patients in less than one percent of all cases (viz., 
0.95 percent).  Oxycodone ranks eighteenth with alcohol being first in frequency of mentions.  
Although OxyContin use and its  connection to drug-related emergencies have increased, 
oxycodone products evidently remain far less widely used than rhetoric often suggests. 
Eastern Kentucky 
 For decades pharmaceutical drug abuse has been a significant social problem in Central 
Appalachia.  Prescription drugs of abuse include well-known and widely used narcotics such as 
Valium and Xanax and newer and more powerful analgesics such as OxyContin, Lorcet, Lortab 
and Vicodin, although Valium and Xanax often remain drugs of choice1 (Kaushik 2001).  
 In Eastern Kentucky, news headlines and stories have documented the OxyContin 
problem by focusing on addictions, drug rehabilitation clinics and their scarce resources, 
OxyContin-fueled property crimes, pharmacy robberies, drug overdoses and deaths, and the 
emergence of a satellite industry selling fake Magnetic Resonance Imaging reports. 
 A former Hazard, Kentucky (Perry County) police chief reported that in a one year 
period (1999 - 2000), the number of OxyContin complaints called into his office increased 
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from one every three months to three or four daily.  The Perry County Park became known as 
“Pillville” -- an indication of its open-air drug market atmosphere.  The OxyContin problem in 
Eastern Kentucky, and specifically Hazard, was a featured and graphic Newsweek cover story 
complete with sensational rhetoric (Rosenberg 2001; cf, Blee and Billings 1999; Giardina 1999; 
Tunnell 2004a).2 
 In Kentucky, arrests for OxyContin abuse have included a former high school 
homecoming queen and the daughters of a reputable businessman, a circuit court judge, a local 
school board member, and a prosecutor.  Other affluent locals include medical doctors charged 
with over-prescribing the analgesic (Sappenfield 2001; Sullivan 2001).  One Eastern Kentucky 
urologist, for example, who was arrested for improperly dispensing the drug reportedly “was 
seeing 120 patients daily” and writing  prescriptions for OxyContin (Dangers of OxyContin 
2001).  Five medical doctors practicing in a small pain clinic in Greenup County, Kentucky were 
indicted on several counts of illegally over-prescribing drugs (Mueller and Camp 2003). 
 Given these events, Kentucky implemented a program designed to electronically track 
prescription drug sales for specific pharmaceuticals, most notably, addictive analgesics 
(Kentucky: OxyContin traffic sparks new controls 2001).  The program, Kentucky All-Schedule 
Prescription Electronic Reporting System (KASPER) enacted in 1998, is designed for doctors 
and pharmacists to monitor patients’ prescriptions, the prescriptions’ source, and frequency of 
refill.  Law enforcement makes use of it to investigate patients, physicians, and pharmacists who, 
they suspect, misuse or over-prescribe pharmaceuticals.  Seventeen states now have some 
tracking database although systems are not linked. 
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Constructing Kentucky’s Problem 
 The OxyContin abuse problem became widely publicized by the media and various office 
holders.  News coverage, in part, created a drug scare or moral panic about a new and powerful 
drug of abuse.  During the late 1990s, OxyContin became the stuff of frequent front-page news 
stories.  News articles consistently increased in number, as Table 1 shows. 
 
Table 1  
OxyContin Keyword Search by Year and Frequency: 
1998-2005 
 
 
.  
 Public and private-sector officials further contributed to this moral panic about a new 
drug of abuse (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994).  Similar to previous drug scares, the OxyContin 
problem was described using hyperbolic imagery and rhetoric.  Its construction relied on sources 
whose claims often went unverified .  For example, much public discourse on OxyContin was 
about its relationship to Eastern Kentucky’s significantly worsening crime problem.  Claims of 
increases in crime and increases related to specifically one variable -- OxyContin -- were widely 
reported as fact.  Although crime data are public record, they typically were ignored by public 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Major Papers 0 0 10 312 158 166 161 172 
Magazines 
&Journals 
0 0 3 16 10 12 20 16 
Legal News 0 0 1 20 33 22 28 20 
Health & Medical 
News 
0 0 3 56 32 47 342 191 
Total 0 0 17 404 233 247 551 399 
r         
j r r          
i  
r l  
        
l          
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and private sector officials who made all sorts of sensational comments about escalating crime 
rates.  Linking any crime increases directly to the introduction of OxyContin has not been 
established.  Rather, the complexities of the crime problem are more enigmatic than this simple 
relationship suggests.  Yet, consider the following: 
 A  commonwealth attorney claimed that the Greenup County Circuit Court docket 
increased almost 25 percent during the year 2001 because of cases of prescription drug abuse 
(Gil 2002).  There were dramatic increases in arrests for prescription drugs in Greenup County 
(and others) especially in 2001.  There were increases in arrests for opium and its derivatives and 
synthetic narcotics.  Marijuana arrests significantly declined that year.  Opiate arrests jumped 
from 17 in the year 2000 to 134 in 2001.  Likewise, synthetic narcotics arrests increased from 
zero in 2000 to 198 in 2001.  Yet, in 2002, only five arrests were made for opiates and none for 
synthetic narcotics.  Today’s arrest numbers remain at the 2002 level.  Furthermore, Greenup 
County has experienced decreases in crime since the introduction of OxyContin from a high of 
153 per 10,000 in 1997 to a low of 70 per 10,000 in 2004.  Yet, these longitudinal trends and the 
temporary increases in opiate arrests went ignored in reports by public officials and the media. 
 A Hazard, Kentucky police chief was reported as claiming that 90 percent of thefts and 
burglaries in that area were to get money to buy OxyContin (Alford 2001).   No explanation for 
thefts and burglaries prior to 1996 (when OxyContin was first marketed) or for fluctuating crime 
rates since then were offered.  For example, the year before OxyContin was manufactured, Perry 
County (which includes Hazard) had 303 crimes per 10,000 population.  In 1996, it had 260; in 
1997, 251; in 1998, 272; in 1999, 264; in 2000, an increase to 382; and in 2001 a decrease to 
308.6 per 10,000 population.  Crime rates then again increased to 336 per 10,000 in 2002 and 
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decreased in 2003 to 331 per 10,000.  A less sensationalistic interpretation is that crime rates in 
Perry County, like nearly everywhere, fluctuate with some years experiencing increases and 
others decreases.  Yet spatial and temporal variance -- a universal feature of crime -- went 
unreported.  Also unreported was the reality of crime in Perry County.  There and across the 
country, the single most frequently occurring index crime is larceny.  Larceny also happens to 
be the least serious of all index crimes.  When controlling for larceny, for example,  Perry 
County’s rate was 150.2 in 2003 -- less than half the total index rate for that year. 
 A closer examination of crime in the four Development Districts of Eastern Kentucky 
(viz., Gateway, Big Sandy, Cumberland Valley and Kentucky River) show fluctuating trends.   
Property crime, the crime type most commonly associated with drug abuse, has varied.  In 
1990, the counties of Gateway District had a property crime average of 150.3 per 10,000.  The 
average decreased to 133.5 per 10,000 in 1994 before increasing to a high of 190.9 per 10,000 
in 1997.  Since then, the county average in Gateway decreased in 2004 to 142.4 per 10,000 -- 
lower than the 1990 average. 
 The situation is different in Big Sandy Development District.  The average for those 
counties was 113.3 per 10,000 in 1990 but decreased in 1994 to 84.9 per 10,000 population.  
Since then, property crime rates have fluctuated with some years increasing and others 
decreasing but never declining to the 1994 levels.  In 2003, the average was 124.9 per 10,000 
but increased dramatically in 2004 to 226.4 per 10,000 population. 
 The counties of Cumberland Valley Development District have perhaps the most erratic 
property crime rates.  The 1990 average for the District was 139.7 per 10,000 but declined to 
133.2 the very next year.  During the next few years, rates decreased and increased to 193.1 per 
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10,000 in 1997 but then declined steadily to 138.9 per 10,000 in 2003.  Similar to Big Sandy, 
rates markedly increased during 2004 to 202.2 per 10,000. 
 Kentucky River Development District counties had an average property crime rate of 
104.3 per 10,000 in 1990 which decreased to a low of 86.6 per 10,000 in 1992.  Rates then 
steadily increased to 145.7 per 10,000 in 2000 but have decreased since then to 120.9 per 10,000 
in 2004.  These data do not show, contrary to published accounts, an escalating crime problem.   
Rather, they show what we have come to expect with crime rates -- variance.  Figures 1, 2, 3, and 
4 longitudinally show crime rates for these four Development Districts. 
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Figure 2
Property Crimes Per 10,000 Population, Big Sandy District 1990-2004
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Figure 1
Property Crime Rates Per 10,000 Population, Gateway District 1990-2004
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Figure 3
Property Crime Per 10,000 Population Cumberland Valley District, 1990-2004
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Figure 4
Property Crime Per 10,000 Population, KY River District 1990-2004
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 Unlike the erratic property crime rates in Eastern Kentucky,  violent crime has steadily 
decreased.  Each Development District had a lower violent crime rate in 2004 than in 1990.  For 
example, Gateway’s 1990 violent crime rate was 32 per 10,000; its 2004 rate was 14.06 per 
10,000.  Big Sandy’s violent crime rate was 17.68 per 10,000 in 1990; in 2004, the district had a 
rate of 14.5 per 10,000.  Cumberland Valley had a rate of 22.9 per 10,000 in 1990 and 2004 rate 
of 11.2 per 10,000 population.  Kentucky River’s violent crime rate was 30.1 in 1990 and half 
that rate in 2004 of 15.7 per 10,000.  Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the longitudinal trends in violent 
crime for these four Development Districts. 
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Figure 5
Violent Crime Per 10,000 Population Gateway District 1990-2004
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Figure 6
Violent Crime, Per 10,000 Population, Big Sandy District 1990-2004
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Figure 7
Violent Crime Per 10,000 Population, Cumberland Valley District, 1990-2004
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Figure 8
Violent Crime Per 10,000 Population, KY River District, 1990-2004
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 Like Eastern Kentucky counties, state-wide numbers have fluctuated with lower rates in 
2004 than in 1994.  In fact, state wide, crime has declined since 1996.  Violent crime has 
decreased by 24.5 percent since 1996.  Property crime has decreased by more than eight percent 
since 1996 although it  increased by one percent from 2003 to 2004 (as is reflected in the 
Development Districts’ 2004 numbers).  The data simply do not support linking any crime 
increases (or decreases) directly to the introduction of OxyContin. 
 Beyond the state and region, the Boston Herald reported that “[OxyContin] is seen as 
fueling a crime wave around the country, particularly in poor areas” (Lasalandra 2003).  
According to this story, a national crime epidemic is associated with the use of this one drug.  
Yet, the fact is, no such crime wave exists.  Crime rates in the United States for years have 
steadily decreased.  Property crime (the type most commonly associated with drug abuse) 
decreased from a high of 5,140 per 100,000 population in 1991 to 3,624 per 100,000.  Property 
crime rates declined 23.4 percent from 1995 to 2004, stabilizing in 2002.  Violent crime rates 
have steadily declined, dropping 32 percent from 1995 to 2004, reaching the lowest levels on 
record. The percentage of households experiencing any type of criminal victimization has 
steadily decreased as has the raw number of households experiencing any crime (Uniform Crime 
Report 2004; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2004). 
 Furthermore, longitudinal data from 1988 to the present show that the ten states with the 
highest per capita OxyContin use have lower property and violent crime rates than the ten states 
with the lowest per capita OxyContin use.  Not only is a national crime wave a fabrication, those 
very states with the highest OxyContin use per capita have experienced declining crime rates 
since OxyContin was first marketed, although differences between these two groups of states are 
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narrowing and are not statistically significant. 
Even Kentucky’s recently elected governor weighed in by publishing that “. . . 
OxyContin problems [are] overwhelm[ing] the law enforcement communities . . .  Substance 
abuse is increasingly linked to violent crimes . . . Over the past eight years, crime has increased 
in Kentucky” (Fletcher and Pence 2003: 33 & 37).  Yet, rather than discussing Kentucky’s 
dynamic crime rates (based on population), the fact that crime in Kentucky did not increase 
during that period, or that violent crime rates were lower in 2003 (and 2004) than in 1996, the 
realities of crime and public perceptions of it were skewed as this publication reported the scary 
number of crimes occurring each minute. 
OxyContin Arrests in Eastern Kentucky 
Rhetoric evidently is more newsworthy than the realities of crime and drug abuse.  For 
example, one Kentucky State Police Captain reportedly claimed that “with drugs such as cocaine 
and marijuana, police could occasionally work their way to Mr. Big.”  But, regarding OxyContin 
and other narcotics, the Captain stated that “each day brings a new kingpin depending on who 
got their prescription filled” (Johnson 2003: A8).  This is a poor analogy.  A prescription 
translates to about 30 pills -- hardly a “kingpin’s” normal inventory.  Yet such rhetoric is 
accepted by the media and reported uncritically to an alarmed public. 
Other unsettling instances include the reporting of “Oxyfest,” the biggest drug raid in 
Kentucky history that netted 201 alleged OxyContin dealers in a two day Federal and State law 
enforcement crackdown (“Police arrest 201 in OxyContin crackdown” 2001).  One U.S. 
Attorney General, justifying the arrests, claimed that during the previous  year, OxyContin had 
caused 59 deaths in Kentucky alone (Alford 2001; “Raids in Kentucky aim at Deadly New 
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Drug” 2001).  Purdue Pharma dismissed his estimates as “inflammatory.”  Although published 
widely, the Attorney General’s claims are not empirically supported. 
 Beyond the published claims about the OxyContin - crime connection, there were and are 
all sorts of reports on high levels of OxyContin use and arrests.  As was noted previously, some 
claim that OxyContin cases are dominating law enforcement and court dockets. Yet data indicate 
that law enforcement attention to OxyContin was short-lived -- only during the year 2001 -- 
despite rhetoric to the contrary. 
 Arrest trends are consistent across the Eastern Kentucky region.  The drug category that 
includes oxycodone, “Opium or Cocaine and their Derivatives,” includes any derivative of the 
poppy plant such as opium, cocaine, morphine, heroin, methadone, and hydrocodone.  Arrests 
for that drug category have varied widely across the past decade and a half.  At the beginning of 
the 1990s, arrest rates for the region averaged about eight  per 10,000 population.  Arrest rates 
dropped, however,  to about two and a half per 10,000 in 1995.  Afterwards, arrest rates never 
reached their 1990 level until the year 2001 when the regional average jumped to 29 arrests per 
10,000.  The very next year, they markedly dropped off  to 3.72 per 10,000.  They remain at 
nearly that level today.  Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12  show longitudinal drug arrests for the four 
Eastern Kentucky Development Districts. 
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Figure 9
Drug Arrests Per 10,000 Populatin, Gateway District, 1990-2004
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Figure 10
Drug Arrests Per 10,000 Population, Big Sandy District, 1990-2004
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Figure 11
Drug Arress Per 10,000 Population, Cumberland Valley District, 1990-2004
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Figure 12
Drug Arrests Per 10,000 Population, KY River District, 1990-2004
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Source: Crime in Kentucky 
R
at
e
Opium
Marijuana
Synthetic Narcotics
Other
 
 
Page 20 Summer 2006 
 
 
 Likewise, regional arrests for synthetic narcotics which can cause addiction (e.g., 
methadone, Demerol, Darvocet) in 1990 averaged .0425 per 10,000.  In 1995, there were no 
reported arrests in Eastern Kentucky for synthetic narcotics.  The next few years witnessed arrest 
rates of less than one per 10,000.  In 2001, however, the region’s average arrest rate markedly 
increased to 45 per 10,000 population.  But, just as sharply, rates dropped off the very next year 
to a regional average of 1.65 per 10,000.  They remain at about that level today. 
 Across the past decade and a half, marijuana arrest rates were several times higher than 
rates for any other drug category.  That is, until the year 2001.  Just as opium and synthetic 
arrests significantly increased, regional marijuana arrests plummeted from 23.16 per 10,000 (in 
2000) to 4.6 in 2001.  The very next year, regional marijuana arrest rates jumped back to almost 
27 per 10,000.  Regional averages remain at about that level today. 
 Regional arrest rates for the category “Other Dangerous Non-Narcotic Drugs” which 
includes stimulants, hallucinogens, and depressants were in double digits for the years 1999 and 
2000, averaging over 31 per 10,000.  Like marijuana, arrests for this category significantly 
declined during 2001 to a low of 2.09 per 10,000.  But, unlike rates for opiates and synthetic 
narcotics, arrest rates for this drug category increased markedly the very next year and have 
remained high -- in fact  higher than any other drug type.  The regional arrest average was nearly 
73 per 10,000 in 2004.  
 Given all the rhetoric about OxyContin abuse, trafficking, doctor shopping, prescription 
fraud and on and on, these data likely are surprising.  If indeed the problem were as dire as 
published accounts have led us to believe, then arrests should have remained somewhat 
consistent with 2001 levels.  But, as the data show, arrests sharply increased for only one year -- 
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2001 -- the very year that the OxyContin problem received so much attention from media and 
public officials.  Ironically, the local newspaper, The Lexington Herald Leader, gave the 
OxyContin story front page news coverage during 2003, a year when arrests for the drug 
category that includes OxyContin were at about four per 10,000 population. 
 Law enforcement likely responded to a socially constructed crisis, then when attention 
(and perhaps, funding and other resources) waned, returned to policing marijuana and the more 
serious drug of abuse -- methamphetamine (which is part of the Other Dangerous Non-Narcotic 
Drug category).  Since then arrests for all other drugs have been much higher than for OxyContin 
and other opiates.  Yet, media coverage of methamphetamine has not equaled that given to 
OxyContin and other narcotics. 
Explanations 
 OxyContin abuse is a highly localized problem requiring specific interpretations.  
Probable explanations for OxyContin abuse within  rural eastern Kentucky include the following: 
prescription drug use is a culturally entrenched phenomenon in Eastern Kentucky; Kentucky 
leads the nation in prescription drug use in part due to the state having the fourth highest cancer 
rate in the nation; Kentucky has an above-average older population that uses prescription drugs; 
Kentucky’s higher levels of chronic illnesses and debilitating diseases contribute to increasing 
numbers of pharmaceutical prescriptions and addictions; prescription fraud largely has been 
ignored by medical, academic and legal communities; OxyContin is a very powerful drug whose 
design makes it easy to abuse; and Purdue Pharma aggressively promoted OxyContin.  This last 
explanation is particularly telling. 
 Over the first five years of manufacture, OxyContin sales totaled $2 billion -- 
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considerably  higher than the company’s projected $350 million (“Painkiller’s sales far exceeded 
levels anticipated by maker”).  According to the Wall Street Journal, sales and marketing 
projections for OxyContin took shape during 1995 when Purdue planned on committing 70 
percent of its sales force’s time to OxyContin immediately after its introduction into the market 
(“Painkiller’s sales far exceeded levels anticipated by maker”).  After five years, the sales force 
was expected to devote 40 percent of its time to OxyContin. But, by Spring 2002, Purdue 
Pharma’s sales force was spending 80 percent of its time promoting it.  Marketing strategies 
specifically targeted medical doctors known for prescribing large numbers of painkillers.  Sales 
representatives personally called on hospital committees responsible for deciding which drugs to 
use (Camp 2003c).  In all fairness, such promotional measures evidently are the norm within the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Purdue’s efforts, however, paid off in a big way.  According to the 
DEA, OxyContin retail sales are now greater than for any other brand-name controlled 
pharmaceutical (Ambien, a sleeping pill, ranks second and Xanax eighth) (OxyContin diversion 
and abuse 2002). 
 Yet a drug panic emerged about OxyContin specifically despite the steady increase in 
sales of other pharmaceuticals.  For example, Ambien sales increased 31 percent from 2000 to 
2001; Duragesic, an analgesic patch that slowly releases “strong medicine for strong pain,” had a 
50 percent sales increase; Adderall, an amphetamine regularly prescribed for attention deficit 
disorders increased in sales 66 percent; Meridia, a drug used for “weight maintenance,” 
increased its sales by 45 percent; and Vicoprofen, a non-single entity hydrocodone, increased in 
sales by 20 percent during this same period.  Since 1990, hydrocodone national consumption has 
increased by 300 percent (Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control).  
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Media attention, though, was nearly singly focused on OxyContin.  
 Another explanation for high levels of OxyContin in Eastern Kentucky is the dual role of 
the DEA.  Other than enforcing federal drug laws, the DEA is responsible for determining 
manufacturing quotas for legal, prescription drugs including powerful analgesics.  The 
Controlled Substances Act mandates that the DEA prevent, detect and investigate the diversion 
of legally manufactured controlled substances all while ensuring that there are adequate supplies 
to meet legitimate medical needs. The agency recently authorized sharp increases in production 
of specific addictive analgesics.  The 2003 quota for hydrocodone, for example, was 14 percent 
higher than 2002 and 75 percent higher than a decade ago (Camp 2003a).  Oxycodone 
production, authorized by the DEA, has increased 1,200 percent since 1993 (Diversion Control 
Program).  
 Both corporate and government policies and practices, particularly the DEA’s charge, 
have contributed to the growth of OxyContin use and abuse in a number of states, most notably 
those in central Appalachia and specifically in Eastern Kentucky.  The pharmaceutical industry 
(along with government support and policy) likewise contributed to the problem.  Data show that 
parts of Eastern Kentucky ranked highest nationally in per capita narcotics distribution.  
Although distributed legally, some drugs are diverted into illegal black markets.  And, an axiom 
about narcotic dispersal is that the more drugs legally bought and sold in a particular area, the 
more that will be illegally diverted (Johnson 2003a; 2003b). 
 Although Eastern Kentucky’s counties led the nation, narcotics distribution increased 
nationally  during the late 1990s as chronic pain was treated more aggressively than previously 
(Johnson 2003a).  The American Pain Society, for example, representing 3,500 pain specialists, 
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during its 2002 annual convention, endorsed the use of OxyContin for severe cases of 
osteoarthritis (Tanner 2002).  A year before, medical doctors adopted a new and aggressive 
approach to treating pain by recognizing it as a vital sign.  This means that physicians measure 
and manage pain as any other vital sign, blood pressure, for example.  Congress, during the 2000 
session, declared the first years of the 21st century as the “Decade of Pain Control and 
Research” (Kalb 2001: 45).  It seems that even these progressive measures by Congress and the 
medical community may have contributed, at least indirectly, to a drug abuse and diversion 
problem. 
Conclusion 
 Like all social problems, the origins of OxyContin abuse are located in social events that 
require social explanations. Kentucky’s problem with OxyContin abuse has particular social 
antecedents.  They include: Purdue’s sales and marketing strategies, Congress’ declaration of the 
“decade of pain,” the medical community treating pain differently (as a vital sign), the DEA 
granting increases in manufacturing, and a history of pharmaceutical use and abuse in rural 
Kentucky.  On the other hand, the OxyContin epidemic’s relationship to crime in Kentucky 
evidently is a socially constructed one with little empirical support.  Likewise, increased 
OxyContin use is not affecting drug arrest rates, given that arrests increased significantly in 2001 
but decreased just as sharply in 2002 (where rates remain today). 
 Whenever drug scares emerge, such as this most recent one with OxyContin, the role of 
the mass media and its focus on a drug at a particular point and time must be questioned.  
Questions also must be raised about how the public comes to accept their stories.  Table 1, as 
discussed earlier,  illustrates the incredible growth in news stories given to OxyContin from zero 
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news or health articles in 1998 (and 1999) to a high of 404 stories in 2001, to little more than 
half that number in 2003 and increasing to a new high of 551 in 2004.  Such news saturation 
about one particular phenomenon contributes to the public acceptance of that news as fact.  The 
Lexington Herald-Leader, the major newspaper serving the bluegrass and the eastern Kentucky 
regions, ran a 12 part series titled, “Prescription for Pain,” between January 19 and February 16, 
2003 (and a Sunday December 7 insert of 20 pages) that detailed the OxyContin problem and its 
alleged connection to worsening crime trends.  The coverage detailed  narcotics abuse and arrests 
in Kentucky.  Yet, it inaccurately presented OxyContin as the most significant factor for 
explaining crime fluctuations and increasing drug arrests; it wrongly characterized crime and 
arrest trends in Eastern Kentucky.  These and other nebulous characterizations were unnecessary, 
some might say,  irresponsible, since crime and arrest data are freely accessible to the public. 
 The OxyContin-crime panic, like others,  is a socially constructed occurrence.  Scares 
usually result in an extreme reaction to a perceived drug problem that may not necessarily 
correspond to its actual social or individual harm.  A panic may arise regardless of a drug’s 
pervasiveness or increases and decreases in its use.  Drug scares, it has been noted, “are 
independent phenomena, not necessarily related to actual trends or patterns in drug use or 
trafficking” (Brownstein 1995: 55).  Drug scares, as moral panics, are symbolic crusades that 
involve particular interest groups or agencies that lead the way in labeling the drug as dangerous.  
In some cases those groups and agencies benefit from such.   This historically has been the case 
as public officials, often aided by media outlets, make less than honest claims for greater crime 
fighting resources and social control initiatives.  The OxyContin-crime propagated relationship 
evidently is only the latest in this long history.  
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Notes 
 
1. Lorcet and Lortab are brand names for the drug Vicodin, a non-single entity hydrocodone.  An 
analgesic for moderately severe pain, Vicodin is an addictive drug. 
 
2.Two sentences from the Newsweek article are illustrative: “Hazard has a long tradition of self-
medication.  Moonshine and marijuana, grown in its fertile soil, have long helped blot out 
depression, boredom, even physical pain . . . OxyContin seemed like the most potent antidote yet 
to the local despair” (Rosenberg 2001: 49).  What Rosenberg fails to acknowledge is that 
moonshine is made and marijuana grown largely as revenue-producing export products.  
Granted, these drugs are used locally, but Hazard, Kentucky is “wet” and spirits are legally 
bought and sold. 
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 Eastern Kentucky University’s College of Justice & Safety began as a single course of-
fering to 49 students in 1966 at Eastern Kentucky State College.  It has evolved to include more 
than 1,300 students and 43 full-time faculty.  The College offers three departments, two service 
centers, four associate degrees, six bachelor’s degrees, three master’s degrees and the designa-
tion of being a Program of Distinction in the commonwealth of Kentucky and one of the fore-
most institutions of learning and research in the fields of justice and safety in the nation and 
world. 
 Currently, under the leadership of Dr. Allen Ault, Dean of the College of Justice & 
Safety, the College has expanded into a multi-million dollar, many-disciplined complex serving 
students locally, nationally and internationally. 
 The three departments housed in the College are Correctional and Juvenile Justice Stud-
ies, Criminal Justice and Police Studies, and Loss Prevention and Safety.  Undergraduate degree 
programs are offered in the areas of: Assets Protection, Correctional and Juvenile Justice Studies, 
Criminal Justice, Emergency Medical Care, Fire and Safety Engineering Technology, and Police 
Studies.  Graduate degree programs are offered in the areas of Loss Prevention and Safety, 
Criminal Justice, and Correctional and Juvenile Justice Studies.  In addition to our academic de-
partments, the College houses the Justice & Safety Center and the Training Resource Center. 
 The goals of the College of Justice & Safety’s departments and centers include enriching 
the lives of the students enrolled in our programs with inspiring and relevant instruction and fur-
thering the studies of the respective fields by participating in research and scholarship. 
 In 1997, the Commonwealth of Kentucky initiated the opportunity for one program from 
each regional university to be chosen as a Program of Distinction, providing more resources to 
develop greater national prominence.  In 1998, the College of Justice & Safety (then the College 
of Law Enforcement) was awarded this designation. 
 Additional state and university funding, provided through the Program of Distinction, has 
allowed the College to add professional staff, provide scholarships and graduate assistantships, 
purchase computers and distance education equipment, provide student and alumni services, sup-
port research and technical assistance, develop international opportunities, and expand our aca-
demic and service offerings. 
 Within the College of Justice & Safety, we do not look upon the Program of Distinction 
as a separate program, but rather one that encompasses and supports every aspect of our students, 
faculty, staff, academic departments, service centers and College success stories. 
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